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IN THF! RUPRPME COTJP.,., OF THP. S'!'ATB OF' TTTAJ-l

THF. RTA'I'B OF tlTAR,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 101 79

ERVIN BRAFFORD,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF' RF.SP0NDP.N.,.,

STATEMEN'r' 0F THF. NATURF. OF '!1HE CASF.

Appellant was charged by information with aggravated
robbery in violation of Utah Corle Ann.,

76-6-302 (lqi.:;3), as

~

amerrled; and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person in violation of TJtah Corle Ann.,

§

70-10-503 (1953), as

amended.

n IS PO s I TI ON

IN TH P. LOWP. :R

cnu RT

Appellant, following a jury trial on November 30 and
December 1, 1981, in the Third Judicial District Court in anfl
for Salt Lake County, tTtah, the Honorable Peter

F'.

Leary,

Judge, presiding, was found guilty of aggravated robbery and
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person.

nn

December 21, 1981, appellant was sentenced to the Utah state
Prison for an indeterminate term of five years to life for
aggravated robbery and an indeterminate term of one to fifteen
years for possession of a rlangerous weapon by a restricted
person; the sentences to run concurrently.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RBL IEF

SOU<';HT ON APPF.:Af,

Respondent seeks a judgment and order of this Court
affirming the jury's verdict and sentences imposed.
STA'r'F.HP,NT OF PACTS
:Robert Hunter, pharmacist at Southeast PharJTtacy in
Salt Lake County, on May 11, 1981, was robhed by two men who
absconded with the pharmacy's prescription drugs and money.
At trial, Mr. Hunter testified that one man entered the
pharmacy carrying a gun and ordered him to lie on the floor
while he, the first robber, searched for all Schedule A
narcotics, consisting for the most part of "severe pain
killers and sleeping pills"

('!'.

135).

With Hunter, the

victim, lying on the floor, a second robber, appellant,
entered the pharmacy

('!'.

135).

Hunter instructed both robbers

where such narcotics could be found ( '1". 111:\).

After both

robbers stated that they were not finding the drugs which they
desired, Hunter offered to assist them by going through the
shelves of the pharmacy (T. 136).

Hunter placed the drugs

into a brown valise (T. 136) held by the robber with the gun,
while appellant opened the cash register which triggered the
pharmacy's alarm system

(~.

117) and activated a camera

located on the north wal 1 of the pharmacy overlooking the
prescription department (T. 13q).

The resulting photographs

of that occasion accurately depict the two robhers with Mr.
Runter during a certain period of time of the robbery.
Although Hunter testified that he was unable to
identify appellant, he din remember that appellant was wearing
-?.-
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what seemed to be a belted vest (T. lnl).

Hunter further

testified that the reason he could not identify appellant was
he was concentrating exclusively on placing the drugs in the
bag

(~.

161).

Positive identification of appellant, as one of

the pharmacy's two robbers, however, was made by Ken Brown, a
parole officer who haa known appellant since 1Q79 (T. 169).
On the basis of this evidence, the jury found beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of aggravated
robbery and possession of a firearm by a restricted person.
ARGUMF.NT

P0IN':!:' I
THE EVIDP.NCF. HAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THF
VERDICT.

Recently, this Court heln it will not overturn a
jury verdict in a criminal case only if the evidence is so
insubstantial that a reasonable man could not have reached the
conclusion that the accused was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.

In State v. Johnson,

P.2d

, Case No. 18021

(January 14, 1981), this Court stated that it:
• • • must view the evidence properly
presented at trial in the light Most
favorable to the jury's verdict, and will
onlv interfere when the evidence is so
lacking and insubstantial that a
reasonable man could not possibly have
reached a verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt. • • •
[Tt must] also view in a
light most favorable to the jury's ver~ict
those facts which can be reasonably
inferren from the evidence presented to
it.

-3-
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Id. at 2 (Rmphasis added).
ntah, fi52 P.2d 942, q45

Ree also:

State v. Mccardell,

(1~82).

More recently, this standard was again stated in
state v. Petree, Case No. 18015 (Utah, February 4, 1983) in
which the Court held:
We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained~a~
reasonable doubt • • • • [citations
omitted] (emphasis adned).
In Petree, the Court's majority believed, following
a review of the facts of the case, that even the most
exaggerated stretch within reason could not close the gap
between any and all inferences which could be drawn by the
jury and the jury's guilty verdict.

In the case at bar,

however, there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict.
The only requirement therefore in reviewing
sufficiency of the evidence claims under Mccardell and its
progeny is that when the facts are viewed in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, there simply must be found a
sufficient amount of evidence supporting the judgment of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant contends that the evidence leaning to his
conviction was insufficient since the victim, Mr. Hunter,
could not identify appellant; the photoqraphs were not

-4-
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clear enough to ascertain appellant's alleqed tatoos on his
arm; ana the photographs, when anmitted into evidence, were
not first subMitted to the jury for its viewing.

Appellant's

claims taken either separately or cumulatively are of no
consequence when juxtaposen tn the sufficient evidence
supporting the jury's verdict.
With respect to appellant's first point concerning
the supposed requirement that a conviction should be
overturnea in light of the victim's inability to identify him,
there simply is nothing (either statutorily or precedentially)
to support this groundless claim.

Adopting appellant's victim

identification rule would not only emasculate murder and
manslaughter cases-in-chief, but also completely eliminate
convictions in those areas as well.

~he

victim of the

robbery, Hunter, testified that appellant was wearing a vest
(T. lnl), a fact which is borne out by the photographs from

the camera which was activated when appellant opened the cash
register

The reason Hunter was unable to positively iaentify

appellant as one of the robbers was his exclusive
concentration in placing the drugs in the bag (T. 161).
Positive identification of appellant as one of the
pharmacy robbers was made by appellant's parole officer,
however, who testified that he had known appellant since 1979
and who identified appellant as the man \·rho was reaching into
the cash register (as depicted by the photographs of the
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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robbery) and identified appellant as the man sitting at the
defendant's table at trial (T. 168-170).

In addition, the

jury, when it retired to consider the evidence, were allowed,
because of the admitted photographs, to make an independent
comparison of the features of the robber of the cash register
with the features of the defendant on trial and therefore
could conclude that appellant had robbed the Southeast
Pharmacy (See F,xhibits 8-21).
Appellant's next contention relating to the quality
of the photographs and the victim's resulting inability to
identify his supposed arm tattoos is a trivial point.

nefense

counsel introduced no evidence indicating that appellant had
the alleged tattoos during the time of the robbery.
Appellant's identification was obtained through the testimony
of his former parole officer, who was familiar with his
features to such an extent that he had no

a if f icul ty

whatsoever in identifying appellant as one of the pharmacy
robbers

('T'.

38-40).

Appellant's final contention that the photographs
were not directly shown to the jury lacks merit as well.
During the Pnrole officer's testimony, in which the parole
officer identified appellant as one of the robbers who was
photographed, the prosecutor asked the parole officer to
indicate to the jury the person he had just identified in the
photograph (T.

18-~Q).

This procedure was followed twice
-6-
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('r'. 18-3'1).

Moreover, all of the photographs were admittec1

into evidence and both prosecution and defense counsel, during
closing .arguMent, encouragen the jury to once again scrutinize
the photographs

{~.

195-?.06).

Apparently, not only were the

photographs of the robbery conclusive evidence tying appellant
to the crimes charged, but so was the parole officer's
testimony positively iaentifying his former parolee clearly
photographed during the commission of his crimes of aggravatea
robbery and the possession of a firearm by a restricted
person.
P0IMT II

TRF:RF WAS ST1F'F'ICIRf'1'"':" EV!DF.:NCr. F0R TPP
'!'RIAL JUDGE TO C.IVP. THP. FLI(;P'J:' n1S"'!"'RUCTI()T-.J
'!10 THF. JTJRY.

Appellant's final contention centers on the trial
judge's giving of the flight instruction to the jury.
Appellant argues that there was insufficient evinence to
support the instruction.

The nature of the particular

instruction in this case merely makes flight an evi<lentiary
consideration in the jury's determination of guilt.

In light

of case law defining flight, appellant's claim of prejudicial
error cannot be sustained.
In People v. Cannadv, lns Cal. Rptr. 129, 501 P.2d
585 er.al. 1972), the defendants arqnerl that the evidence
-7-
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din not warrant the giving of a flight instruction which was
virtually identical to the one given in the case at bar.I
There the court held that the jury could reasonably infer that
defendant's flight reflected consciousness of guilt from the
evidence presented at trial.

mhe court went on to state:

Flight requires neither the physical act
of running nor the reaching of a far-away
haven.
~he evidence is sufficient to
support the giving of the instruction.
5 01 P. 2d at 59 1 •
In the instant case the instruction read to the jury
was:
The flight or attempted flight of a person
immediately after the commission of a
crime or after he is accused of a crime
that has been committed, is not sufficient
in itself to establish hi8 guilt, but is a
fact which, if proven, may be considered
by you in the light of all other proven
facts in deciding the question of his
guilt or innocence.
,,.,he weight to which

lThe Cannady instruction read:
The flight of a person immediately after
the commission of a crime, or after he is
accused of a crime that has been
committed, is not sufficient in itself to
establish his guilt, but is a fact which,
if proved, may be considered by you in the
liqht of all other prove0 facts in
deciding the question of his guilt or
innocence.
'J"he weight to which such
circumstance is entitled is a matter for
the jury to deterine.

-n-
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such circumstance is entitled is a matter
for the jurv to determine.
are further instructed that flight
affords a hnsis for an inference of
consciousness of '1 uilt and constitutes an
implied admission (:R.• 94).

~ou

The nklahoma courts have approved the givinq of similar flight
instructions.

See Ward v. state, 444 P.2rl 25S (Okl. Crim.

19 6 8 ) and Pv 1 e s v • state , 4 R 3 P • 2 d 11 n5 ( nk 1 • r.r i m. 1 q 71 ) •

The Washington Supreme Court in an earlier case
offered a liberal definition of what is meant by "flight."
State v. Wilson, 174 P.2d

55~

(Wash. lq4fi) the Court

explained:
TO constitute flight it is not necessary
that there should be an escape from jail
or froM an officer, but it may consist in
a departure from the place of the crime by
one conscious of gult even before
suspected of the crime.
Id.

Later, the Missouri Supreme Court in State v.
Aubuchon, 3"-1

S.W.~d

3/.7 (196S), stated:

'r'he term "flight" denotes the act of
leaving the scene or vicinity of the
crime, and the act of flight may be shown
on the issue of guilt.
I~.

(Mo.

at 335.

See also:

State v. Ward, SlR S.W.2d

6R~,

~Rq

App. 1()75).
-9-
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rn·

Instructions, as the one given in this case, assume
neither the quilt nor innocence of the defendant.

See People

v. naener, 96 Cal. App. 2d R27, R32-R33, 216 P.2d 511, 514
(1950).

~hus,

the flight instruction as it was given by the

trial judge in this case, is qenerally interpreted as simply
leaving the scene of a crime and is a factor,

if proven at

trial, which should be considered by the jury.

Flight, with

nothing more, is circumstantially insufficient to sustain a
guilty vernict.

Instruction No. 19 did not contain this

prejudicial defect, but rather contained the necessary caveats
to guara against any misguiden conclusions which the jury
might have drawn as to what evidence of flight there was.
Mr. Runter testified that following the robbery,
appellant left the pharmacy and thus there was sufficient
evidence to support both the flight instruct ion and the
reasonable inference that departure from the place of the
crime could constitute "flight"

(~.

151).

A.ssurrting arguendo that the trial court did err in
instructing the jury as to flight, the error still does not
approach the degree of substantiality which would justify
reversal of appellant's conviction in this case.
:Rule 3n of the Utah Pules of Criminal Procedure
states , in pertinent pa rt:

Any error, defect, irreqularity or
variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a partv ·S"KaTl be
Clisregarde~.
--10-
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ntah r.o<1e of CriMinal Procedure,

E;

7'7-~5-30(

a) (Supp. 1Q81) •

This stanoard has been applied by this Court in 0rteqa v •
'J'homas, 14 ntah 2d 2Q6,

3~3

P.2d 40fi

(19~1).

In Ortega, the

court, in considering alleged errors contained in jury
instruct ions, inter al ia, held:
In order to justify reversal, the
appellant must show error that was
substantial and prejudicial in the sense
there is at least a reasonable likelihood
that in the absence of the error the
result would have been different.

It is therefore incumbent upon appellant to
demonstrate that but for the defective instruction, the jury
would have reached a different conclusion.

Appellant has

failed to carry this burden and therefore, even assuming error
on the part of the trial judge in giving the instruction, such
error was harmless.
POINT III
APPEI.1LAWT S FAILING TO COMPLY WI'I':P TJT~.H
RTJLE s OF CIVIL PROCP.nURF,, 7 S( p) (?) (a)
roNS'T.'ITtTTRS A SEPARAT:P AND INDEPENDENT
BASIS FOR AFFIRMANCR OF HIS cnNVICTION.
1

'

Appellant ignores the requirement that his hrief,
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, '7S(p)(2)(d), must
contain " • • • a concise statement of the material facts of
the case citinq the pages of the record supporting such
statement."
-11-
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This Court, in State v. Tucker, Case No. 17944
(December 29, 1982), recently held:
separate ana independent basis for the
af firMance of the trial court is that the
defenaant failen to refer to any portion
of the record that factually supports his
contentions on appeal.
This court will
assume the correctness of the judqrnent
below if counsel on appeal does not comply
with the requirements of Rule ;5 • • • as
to making a concise statement of facts and
citation of the pages in the record where
they are supported.
A

Id.
In light of appellant's failure to make such
citations, this Court should affirm

hi~

conviction.

CONCLUSION
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction on the
grounds that the victim could not positively identify him as
the pharmacy robber, the photographs nepicting a period of
time during his crimes were of such low quality tht positive
identification of him as one of the rohhers was impossible,
the photographs were not submitted properly for the jury's
perusal, and finally the flight instruction could not be
sustained by the evidence.

Victim identification is not an

essential factor in the prosecutor's case-in-chief in light of
other means leading to positive identification such as a
parole officer identifyinq appellant as the photographed
-1 /.-
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phar~acy

robber.

~he

jury did observe the photographs on

several occasions during the course of the trial, and took the
photographs when they retired to deliberate.

There was

sufficient evidence to the effect that appellant had departed
from the pharmacy which was sufficient to support the trial
judqe's flight in5truction.

In light of this evidentiary

support, respondent urqes this Court to affirm appellant's
convictions ana sentences.
'Respectfully suhmi tted this

J;;{

day of_ February,

1983.
DAVID L. WILKINSot1

Attorney General

General
CBRTIFICA~B

OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailen three true ana exact
copies of the foregoing Rrief, postage prepaid, to Lynn R.
Brown, Attorney for Appellnnt, Salt Lake Legal nefender
Assoc.,

3~3

South 200 F.ast, Salt Lake City, ntah, 84111, this

day of February, 1QR3.
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